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I IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DFDLE Y lH. A.MOSS, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HEBER BENNION, JR., VERA "r· BENNION, his wife, and BEN-
NION RANCHING CO.MPANY, 
a Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Cases 
No. 
, 10393 
and 
10482 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to compel performance by defend-
ants of an alleged contract to sell their ranch lands 
and livestock to plaintiff. 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
The defendants with their counsel and their wit-
nesses appeared before the lower court on April 28, 
1 
1965, prepared for the trial of this case as scheduled. 
Before permitting the case to proceed to trial, however 
and having disallowed and denied defendants' Offei'. 
of Proof, and defendants having been permitted to offer 
no evidence in the matter, the Court granted Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment against the defendants 
Heber Bennion, Jr. and Yera ,V. Bennion, his wife. 
The Court ruled that an enforceable contract existed 
between the parties and that an Earnest Money Receipt 
and Offer to Purchase, dated August 12, 1964, which 
constituted the only written evidence of the alleged 
contract, was "plain and certain" in meaning, leaving 
"no uncertainty, no indefiniteness (and) no ambiguity" 
as to its terms, thereby entitling plaintiff to an enforce· 
ment of those terms as a matter of law. 
Thereafter, on September 8, 1965, following a 
further hearing, the Court granted Summary Judg· 
ment against the defendant, Bennion Ranching Com· 
pany, holding it bound by the same contract and to 
the same extent as the individual defendants. 
An appeal was taken from each of the summary 
judgments, the first, involving the individual defe~d­
ants, being Case No. 10393, and the second, involvmg 
the corporate defendant, being Case No. 10482. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
l f l narv J. uda· Defendants seek a reversa o t le sum1 . I" 
. . h tl 11 ed contract ment and a rulmg bv this Court t at le a eg . 
. I~ ti lternatnc. is a matter of law unenforceable. n 1e a 
2 
defewlants seek a reversal of the summary judgment 
11 ith diredions to give defendants a full trial as to all 
of the issues presented. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
It is well established that in Utah, as elsewhere, 
courts should be reluctant to invoke the drastic remedy 
of a summary judgment, since it prevents a litigant 
from fully presenting his case to the courts. Brandt 
i:. Sprinyville Banking Co., 10 U2d 350, 353 P2d 
~60 ( 1960). Only where the pleadings, evidence, ad-
missions, and inferences therefrom, when viewed most 
favorably to the losing party, show clearly that there 
remains no genuine issue as to any material fact, and 
that the winner is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law, it is proper to grant a summary judgment. Such 
a showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reason-
able possibility that the loser could win if given a trial. 
Frederick May & Co. v. Dunn, 13 U 2d 40, 368 P 2d 
266, (1962). On appeal from a summary judgment 
this Court is obliged to consider the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favor-
able to the losing party. Whitman v. W. T. Grant Co., 
16 U2d 81, 395 P2d 918 ( 1964). 
Thus, the defendants, having suffered the entry 
of summary judgments aginst them, and having been 
wholly <lepriYed of their right to present their case or 
any part of it to the lower court, are entitled to have 
their po.'iition considered on this appeal in a manner 
3 
consistent with the foregoing rules· that · t . . , . is o say m 
the light most favorable to them. ·' 
In this brief, the parties are referred to as thei· 
appeared in the trial court. All references to the recor;l 
are to the red page numbers. The typed page numbers 
are ignored. 
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS 
For more than forty-five ( 45) years, the defend-
ants, Heber Bennion, Jr., age 77, and Yera \V. Bennion, 
his wife, age 73, have owned and operated a ranch and 
livestock business in Daggett County, near Manila, 
G tab. ( R. 138). During those many years up to August, 
1964, they were able, through hard work, careful man-
agement and thrift to build up and expand their prop-
erties and operations so that they included approxi-
mately 900 acres of irrigated crop lands having a market 
value of approximately $200.00 per acre, and approxi-
mately 1180 acres of uncultivated grazing or range 
lands having a market value of approximately $50.00 
per acre. (R. 66, 187). All of the lands except one 
tract known as Henry's Fork, located in Sweetw~t~r 
County, "r yoming, and consisting of 200 acres of irri· 
gated land and 120 acres of unirrigated land, are ~lose~y 
adjoined. Also included among these properties, Ht 
· l 1675 h ad of sheep August, 1964, were approximate y e . 
and 218 head of cattle, ( R. 184) having a value '.n 
. · ·1 ges worth III 
excess of $50,000.00, and grazmg pr1v1 e 
excess of $5,000.00. ( R. 192). 
4 
., 
D11e to health problems experienced by Mrs. 
1 Benniou iu recent years and the heavy demands of the 
Hitire rnuching operation upon both of the Bennions 
at their ad ranced age, they decided to sell a portion 
nf their lands. ( R. 139). Accordingly they listed the 
Henry's Fork property in \Vyoming for sale with 
Phelp's Hcalty of .Midvale, Utah. (R. 63). At the 
, suggestion of )Ir. Dan Brown, agent for Phelp's 
Realty, the property was listed for sale at $42,500.00 
(R. 63). 
The plaintiff, Dudley l\I. Amoss, an active member 
of the Ctah Bar since 1955, expressed interest in the 
Bennion properties and conferences were had between 
the Bennions and .Mr. Amoss, accompanied by 1.\fr. 
Brown, ostensibly as the real estate agent. It later 
dereloped, however, that Brown was a partner with 
Amoss in the purchase from the Bennions. (R. 106). 
The conferences culminated in the signing on 
August 12, l!)GJ., of an Earnest l\Ioney Receipt and 
Offer to Purchase, to formalize an agreement which 
1 
the Bennions expected would be drafted up in the form 
of a detailed contract for sale of virtually the entire 
Benu;un properties to Amoss. 
In their initial negotiations, Amoss offered to pay 
~JOO 000.00 for approximately 860 acres of the Bennion 
iand.). ( R. 140). IIowever, due to complications en-
'uuuterrd in attempting to divide the properties so as 
111 pro\'1de suitable fence lines and access and irrigation 
111 both the land to be sold and those to be retained, it 
5 
was proposed. by Mr. ~ennion that .Mr. Amoss pur· 
chase the entire Benmon ranches, reserving to the 
Bennions a life estate in the five-acre tract upon which 
their home is located. (R. 140, 141). 
Inasmuch as the course of the discussions and 
events which followed this proposal by l\lr. Bennion 
to sell virtually the entire ranching properties are 
essential to a proper construction of the terms used 
in the Earnest J\loney Receipt and Offer to Purchase, 
and to an understanding of the dispute between the 
parties and the issues presented in this appeal, they 
are set out below at some length. 
At first Mr. Bennion offered to sell for $200,000.00 
all of the real property, machinery and equipment and 
water rights, excepting only the five-acre life estate 
referred to above and sufficient irrigation and culinary 
water for the life estate. (R. 141). 
This offer contemplated that Bennion would either 
pay off from his own funds a debt in the amount of 
$49,000.00, owed on a Federal Land Bank mortgage. 
or that a deduction would be made from the purchase 
price of $200,000.00 to the extent of payments made 
on the Federal Land Bank mortgage by Amoss. In 
other words, Amoss would have an option to either 
assume and pay this mortgage and deduct the payments 
from the purchase price or let Bennion pay it and remain 
liable for the full purchase price. (R. 141). 'fhe n~t 
. h B . der tin' amount to be received by t e enmons, un 
l t ti Federnl offer, after payment of the debt owe< o 1e 
6 
Land ]fank, was to be $151,000.00. At this point there 
had been no discussion as to possible sale of the livestock 
or range rights, it being .Mr. Bennion's intention to 
sell these separately on the open market, or to other 
indiriduals. ( R. 141). 
Mr. Amoss was agreeable to these terms and he, 
assisted by Dan Brown, who had been present through 
the discussions, commenced drawing up an Earnest 
jfoney Receipt and Offer to Purchase, (R. 16). here-
inafter called the Earnest Money Receipt. In filling 
it out, however, several further problems arose which 
required solution. 
Amoss wanted all mineral rights to be conveyed 
11ith the property. Bennion wanted to reserve these but 
finally conceded and agreed to transfer the mineral 
rights as a part of the sale. ( R. 64) . Amoss next wanted 
Bennion to include the livestock, worth in excess of 
$,j(),000.00, and the range rights which the Bennions 
had purchased from a l\fr. Schofield. 
Mr. Bennion promptly and emphatically advised 
Amoss and Brown that neither the livestock nor range 
rights would be included in the sale price of $200,000.00 
which he had offered to accept. ( R. 141). He explained 
that both represented a substantial equity in favor of 
1 the Bennions over and above debts that were owed 
against them. Amoss and Brown were informed that 
there would be no sale unless this equity interest were 
recognized and paid for by Amoss. Thus the parties 
reached a11 impasse. 
7 
In further discussions, Bennion advised Amoss 
that a sum of about $35,000.00 was owed under a live-
stock mortgage to Utah Farm Production Credit Asso-
ciation, hereinafter referred to as P .C .A., and that th~ 
further sum of $5,100.00 was owed to Schofiel1l on the 
range rights. It was finally agreed tlia t i11 return for 
the transfer of the livestock and range rights to Amos~, 
the purchase price would be raised from $200,000.00 
to $206,000.00, to compensate the Bennions for their 
equity in the livestock and range rights. Amoss was to 
pay from his own funds all sums owed to the P.C.A 
and to Schofield, with no reduction from the purchase 
price for such payments. (R. 143). By this means, 
Ainoss would get the livestock and would obligate him· 
self to pay for them a sum somewhat less than, but 
approaching, their fair market value. The Hennions 
would realize something on their equity in the livestock 
and range rights. 
In further discussions at the same time, the Ben-
nions expressed their desire to retain ownership of a 
sixty-acre tract, approximately forty acres of which 
was irrigated land, located under a high ledge rim at 
the southwest corner of their properties and known as 
the Keel place. ( R. 146-147). .Alnoss was agreeable 
to this on condition that the Bennions deduct the value 
of this tract from the purchase price of $206,000.00 as 
previously computed. (R. 147). To arrive at this valne. 
f. . . t d l d . ·ed ·it $·'00.00 the forty acres o Irnga e an were pnc ' ' -
per acr~ and the remaining twenty acres were pri~ed 
at $50.00 per acre, for a total of $9,000.00. (R. Ui 
1 
8 
This figure, when subtracted from the price of $206,-
ooo.oo, left a sale price of $197,000.00, which was then 
written into the Earnest .:Money Receipt. Thus, it was 
agreed at that point, and all parties clearly understood, 
that the net amount to be received by the Bennions, 
:ifter payment of all debts owed the P .C.A., Schofield 
and the Federal Land Bank, was to be approximately 
$U8,000.00. (R. 66). 
HaYiug thus apparently resolved the foregoing 
problems by negotiation, Amoss and Brown completed 
the Earnest l\loney Receipt, as it appears in Exhibit 
D-6, and it was signed by Amoss as purchaser, by 
Brown on behalf of Phelp's Realty and by the Ben-
nions as sellers. The addition of the notarial seal and 
jurat and the crossing out of the words "Phelp's 
Realty'', as appears on Exhibit 1-P, occurred after the 
Earnest Money Receipt was signed. (R. 280). 
Before the document was signed by lVfr. Bennion, 
for himself and on behalf of Bennion Ranching Com-
pany, a elosely held corporation in which title to some 
1 
of the properties were held, a long distance telephone 
1 eall was placed to J. Lambert Gibson, attorney for 
Bennion, and both Bennion and Amoss talked to him 
l 
about the proposed sale. And, though portions of the 
Earnest Money Receipt, as prepared, were read to 
jfr. Gibson, he was not advised as to the details of 
the negotiations supposedly incorporated in part into 
Earnt>st l\loney Receipt, or the values, prices or details 
1 'f Jlarme11t which underlay the agreement. (Deposition 
9 
of J. Lambert Gibson, pp. 14-15; R. 193). His prin-
cipal concern at that time was the tax consequences 
to the Bennions of the proposed sale and he as~umed 
that Amoss was to pay the debts to P.C.A., the Fetleral 
Land Bank and Schofield from his own funds just 
as he was to pay the real estate commission, which he 
also agreed in precisely the same terms in the Earnest 
l\Ioney Receipt to pay from his own funds, without 
deduction from the purchase price. (Deposition of S. 
Lambert Gibson, p. 15; R. 198). 'fhus, without at· 
tempting, at that distance and with his limited know!· 
edge of the terms involved, to pass upon the sufficiency 
of the Earnest :Money Receipt to accurately reflect 
the proposed agreement of the parties, l\Ir. Gibson 
told the Bennions that if the instrument reflected their 
agreement to go ahead and sign it. They then did so 
with the understanding that a detailed, formal contract 
of sale would be prepared by Amoss in which the many 
obvious loose ends and details of the sale and purchase 
would be spelled out. (R. 67, 182). 
Either later that same day or the following day. 
the Bennions noticed that Amoss or Brown, perhaps 
intentionally, had left a slip of paper in the lleunion 
home on which computations of the sale were listed. 
(R. 179). They noticed that the figures apparent!)" 
· f the reflected a deduction from the purchase pnee 0 
amount of the Federal Land Bank mortgage. as agreed, 
. . b "d ff b A l 1'11 ·iddition. smce it was to e pa1 o y moss, an< ' 
. h . t f the deLts a deduction, contrary to t elf agreemen , o 
owed to the P .C.A. and to Schofield. 
10 
The possible implications of these computations 
1 li~turbcd the Be11nions greatly inasmuch as the agree-
ment oil this point had been so carefully worked out 
and it 'ms so clearly understood that, although Amoss 
11 as to assume and pay all of these obligations, he 
\\'oulcl, nevertheless, be entitled to deduct from the 
purdiase priee only the payments on the Federal Land 
Bank mortgage. Yet the effect of a reduction in the 
purdiase price of the additional sums owed to the 
P.C.A. and Schofield would be to require the Bennions 
to par off these debts from their own funds while at 
tlw same time giving the livestock and range rights 
to Amoss free and clear. Such an arrangement would 
reduce Amoss' obligation to between $40,000.00 and 
$.30.000.00 less than he had actually agreed to pay. 
In order to resolve the question thus raised without 
further lapse of time and to protect their rights in case 
.imoss intended to claim the right to a deduction from 
tlie purchase price for payments made to the P.C.A. 
and to Schofield, contrary to their clear understanding 
un that point, .l\Ir. Bennion contacted Mr. Gibson 
1 
either that same day or the following day. After ex-
plaining the background of the question thus raised, 
lie instructed Gibson to find out from Amoss immedi-
ately what his position was so that action could be taken 
\ at once should there be an issue on the point. ( R. 179). 
\Vlien Gibson contacted Amoss within a day or 
111 0 tliereafter and inquired as to his position, Amoss 
ilatei] tltat he would "stand on the contract," and that 
11 
the payments to P.C.A. and Schofield woul<l be de-
ducted from the purchase price. ( R. 199). Gibson then 
told Amoss that this was not the agreement to whidi 
the Bennions had assented and that in his opinion the 
contract was ambiguous. He told Amoss explicitly 
that if he insisted on that interpretation, there woul;l 
be no sale. Amoss then replied that .Mr. Brown haJ 
a complete set of notes he had taken during the nego-
tiations and that he would, therefore, have Brown talk 
to Gibson about it. (R. 199). 
'Vhen Brown contacted Gibson shortly thereafter, 
he agreed with Bennion that there was to be no deduc-
tion from the purchase price except to the extent of 
payments made by Amoss on the Federal Land Bank 
mortgage. (R. 116-117); Gibson Deposition, pp. 16-
17). The next day, Brown and Gibson went to the 
Bennion ranch and advised the Bennions that such "·as 
the understanding and the agreement. ( R. 200). 
Having thus satisfied themselves that Amoss in· 
tended to honor his agreement in this regard, the Ben· 
nions and Gibson went ahead with the steps invo!Yed 
in the sale. :Mr. Bennion had his abstracts brought up 
to date and these were delivered to Amoss. (R. 182). 
He assisted Amoss and Brown, who was then manag· 
ing Amoss' interest in the properties, in every way .he 
could to assure a smooth turn over of the properties 
when the final contracts were drawn up by, nnd the 
properties delivered to, Amoss. Throughout the con· 
. II . 1ested versations with Amoss, Benmon repeate< ~ rerp · 
12 
' that the c:losiug documents be completed and delivered 
to him, awl Amoss always insisted that he would draw 
them tl_lJ himself and present them to Bennion and 
Gibson. 
In a further meeting with Amoss and Brown at 
l\moss · office in Salt Lake City, on September 14, 
!96~, on matters relating to the sale, Amoss again told 
Bennion and Gibson that he understood there would 
be no deduction except as to payments under the 
Federal Land Bank mortgage. ( R. 200). 
With this understanding and based upon this re-
affirmatiou of Bennion's position, possession of the 
properties, including livestock, was turned over to 
Amoss the following day. 
Also, during the period up to October 10, 1964, 
in repeated other contacts with Brown and Amoss, 
Bennion was given to believe that there was no further 
problem in this regard. The matter had been raised 
tliredly with Amoss and he and Brown had agreed with 
1 Hennion's position. 
Not until a meeting in Amoss' office on October 
10, 1964, did Amoss dispute that Bennion's position 
iras correct. In that meeting he denied having conceded 
the matter and reverted to his old position that he 
110uld "stand on the contract," (R. 202) and insist 
11
11 deducting the P .C.A. and Schofield payments. By 
llii~ time, of course, Amoss had sold nearly all of the 
r·~ttle and sheep ( R. 48, 49) and apparently felt he 
13 
could force Bennion to abandon his claim to full pay. 
ment. Bennion and Gibson walked out of Amoss' otfi~e 
when he told them of his new position. 
The following day, Amoss flew to Manila, Utah, 
and in a conversation with Bennion and Gibson, and 
with Brown present, agreed to compromise the dispute 
and to add $17,500.00 to the purchase price. (R. 120). 
Other details of the sale were discussed and agreed to 
at the same time. Prior to this meeting Amoss also 
claimed a right to $2,100.00 worth of stock which Ben· 
nions owned in the P.C.A. although this had never been 
discussed between them or mentioned in the Earnest 
Money Receipt. 
Approximately one week following this meeting, 
which occurred at Bennion's home, Amoss forwarded 
to Gibson, for execution by Bennion, an Assignment 
of 800 irrigation shares (Exhibit 3D) , a Bill of Sale 
(Exhibit 4D) and a Real Estate Mortgage (Exhibit 
5D), apparently to close the sale under the newly 
reached agreement. In reviewing the mortgage, Gibson 
noticed the "release provisions" whereby Bennion would 
agree that for each $200.00 paid by Amoss they w~ul~ 
release to Amoss at Amoss' selection, one acre of 1rri· 
gated, cultivated land, or for each $50.00 paid, Ben· 
nions would release one acre of unirrigated, uncuJtiyated 
· I ded land. Further, the proposed documents me u 
about one-half of the land known as the Keel place 
which the parties had agreed the Bennions could.reserve 
at the southwest corner of their ranch properties. 
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There had been no previous discussion as to release 
prorisious as thus prepared, and the proposed instru-
ments clearly violated the previous agreement that 
Bennion would retain all of the land known as the Keel 
place below the ledge rather than just half of it. The 
release provisions as framed by Amoss were particularly 
intolerable to Bennion ( R. 196) since it would permit 
Amoss to pick up the land in a checkerboard pattern 
so as to destroy for all practical purposes the value 
of the remaining land and thus render valueless the 
only security which the Bennions were retaining. 
This attempt by Amoss to again completely re-
write the agreement to his own advantage in violation 
of the prior understandings, coming as it did after his 
duplicitous conduct in agreeing to, then denying, Ben-
nions' right to the full purchase price reduced only 
by the amount of the .Federal Land Bank mortgage 
payments, and his failure to provide the closing con-
tract and documents which he had insisted on doing 
himself, and which Bennion had repeatedly requested 
that he furnish, made it impossible for Bennion to stand 
still any longer. By this time, most of his livestock had 
been sold hy Amoss, who refused to keep Bennion 
adrised as to the sales or account for the proceeds as 
he had agreed. He had repeatedly repudiated his own 
agreenwnts and the understandings he had reached 
11ith Bennion and Gibson. He had forced the Bennions 
t1Jto a drastic compromise of their rights under threat 
11f litigation. Further even, to the present date, Amoss 
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hasn't paid a single dollar to the Bennions toward the 
purchase price of the property as agreed. 
Thus, it became painfully apparent, more than 
two months after the Earnest l\!Ioney Receipt was 
signed, that Amoss intended to renege on this agree-
ment where it was to his advantage to do so and to 
rely upon legal technicalities. Without legal training, 
Bennion could not expect to meet him any longer on 
even terms. Accordingly, on advice of his counsel, 
Bennion told Brown and Amoss to cease exercising 
dominion over his lands and those of his livestock that 
remained, until such time as the matter could finally 
be settled. This suit was filed within a few days there-
after. 
It will readily be noted from the Earnest .Money 
Receipt (R. 16) that it provides for a deposit of $500.00 
and an initial payment of $14,500.00 to have been paid 
on September 1, 1964, the date of delivery of possession 
to Amoss. As noted above, however, not a dollar of 
these amounts has been paid to Bennions. Although 
Exhibit "A" in. the Earnest Money Receipt refers 
to the reservation of a five-acre life estate there is no 
description of the boundaries of the land to be included. 
The document refers to an "Exhibit C", Inventory of 
Personal Property included in the sale, attached, yet 
I · ro-no such inventory has ever been prepared. t is P 
vided that the balance of the purchase price is to be 
paid in 15 "equal annual payments" but the a~ount 
of the balance to be paid was omitted, perhaps inten-
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tioually, by Amoss and Brown. No provision is made 
for date or place of payment or who is to receive them. 
The Earnest .l\Ioney Receipt provides that the 
"buyer (is) to assume Federal Land Bank Loan, 
P.C.A. livestock loan and R. Schofield range contract 
and that "Buyer assumes entire commission." And 
while Amoss claims that he can deduct payments to the 
P.C.A. and Schofield, he admits, nevertheless, that the 
real estate commission which he also "assumes" under 
the contract was to be paid from his own funds without 
the right to a deduction. (R. 106, 107). 
Although Amoss readily admits that reservation 
of the Keel place to Bennion ( R. 89) was a part of 
the agreement, the Earnest Money Receipt contains 
not a single word in that regard. Nor does it mention 
the shares of irrigation water which Bennion reserved 
for use 011 the Keel place, though that was similarly 
a part of the agreement. It was because of the need 
to tie down the many details of the sale, of which the 
foregoing are but examples, that the parties contem-
plated the preparation of a detailed contract of sale 
by Amoss for approval by the Bennions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN RULING 
TfL\'l' THE CONTRACT lV AS ENFORCE-
ABLE AS A l\IATTER OF LAW. 
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To begin with, it is well established in Ctah that 
a contract is to be construed strictly agai11st a partr 
who prepares or furnishes it. It has been speciticall;· 
recognized that in Utah this rule is particular!~· appli~. 
able where, as here, the party furnishing and preparing 
the contract is an attorney. Maw v. Noble, 10 T:tah 
2d 440, 354 P 2d 121 (1960); Andreasen v. Hansen, 
8 Utah 2d 370, 335 P2d 404 ( 1959). The salutary 
effect of this rule is to require one who is trained a11;l 
knowledgeable in legal rules and technicalities to con· 
duct his dealings with a layman in an open, frank and 
forthright manner. Any other rule would leave the 
layman, as a practical matter, at the mercy of the 
superior legal knowledge of the attorney, as this case 
readily demonstrates. 
It has likewise been recognized by this Court that 
a fiduciary realtionship exists between a real estate 
agent and his client and it is incumbent upon the agent 
to honestly and fairly represent the interests of those 
who engage his services under penalty of rerocation 
of his license. Reese v. Harper, 8 Utah 2<l 119, 329 
P 2d 410 ( 1958) ; Reich v. Clzristupulos, 123 f'tah 
137, 256 P 2d 238 (1953); Section 61-~-11. U.C.A 
1953. lie must apply his abilities and knowledge to 
f ll the advantage of the man he serves; and make u 
disclosure of all facts which his client should know 111 
. b . R H pra . Reich transactmg the usmess. eese v. arper. su ' · 
v. Christopulos. supra. 
A pp lying the foregoing rules to the present easel 
it will be noted that Amoss has been a pradicing nnr 
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adire member of the Utah Bar since 1955. Brown 
acted as real estate agent for the realty firm which 
had been highly recommended to Bennion for reliability 
aud inkgrity. Both of them are young, active and alert. 
The Beunions, on the other hand, though well educated 
and suceessful ranchers, had only a meager knowledge 
of real estate transactions and no legal or commercial 
training as such. At their advanced ages, and looking 
forward to a eomfortable retirement, they were in no 
position either by experience, training or inclination 
to match wits with Amoss and Brown. 
Thus, in the present case, where the contract was 
furnished and prepared by Amoss, assisted by Brown, 
ostensibly as a real estate agent, but in fact the undis-
closed partner of Amoss to this purchase, it becomes 
doubly imperative that the rule of strict construction 
be carefully observed to prevent the type of overreach-
ing which oecurred here. 
In view of the foregoing rules governing con-
1lructio11 of' contracts, and this Court's pronouncements 
gorerning the granting of summary judgment, it seems 
incredible that the defendants could have been pre-
l'iuded, as a matter of law, from challenging the force 
and effect of the alleged contract, and that they could 
have been deprived of their right to fully present their 
('ase to the court, as they were prepared to do. Such 
a disposition of this case is wholly unsupportable for 
a number of reasons as outlined below, each of which 
alu1w re(p1ires a reversal of the summary judgment of 
dir l .nwer Court. 
19 
In ~~der to be enforceable by court proeeedingb 
for specific performance, a contract for sale or con-
veyance of real property must be definite, certain and 
unambiguous in its essential and material terms, -HI 
Am. Jur. 2d 36 (Specfic Performance, Seetion 2:!), and 
it must express each material term in a reasonabl\' 
definite manner. Bruggeman v. Sokol, (Calif. n.c:. 
1954) 265 P2d 57 5. The contract is sufficiently definite 
if, and only if, the obligations of each of the parties 
can be determined from the instrument without aid 
of parol evidence as to the parties' intentions. 81 C.J.S. 
487 (Specific Performance, Section 316). A greater 
degree of certainty, moreover, is required in a suit for 
specific performance than in an action for damages. 
81 C.J.S. 483 (Specific Performance, Section 31). 
Applying these principles, the courts haYe held 
contracts such as the one involved in the present case 
to be, as a matter of law, unenforceable on the ground 
they were too ambiguous, indefinite and uncertain. Thus 
in Hubbell v. Ward, ('Vash. 1952), 246 P2d 468, the 
court overruled a decree of the trial court w hieh directed 
the defendant "to enter into a real estate contract ac· 
cording to the terms on an Earnest .Money Receipt 
and agreement" for purchase of an apartment house. 
The Earnest :Money Receipt in that case contained a 
provision by which the purchaser agreed to pay n dowH 
pavment and "sign a contract for the balanee, payable 
• 1 . l 1 · . t t ·1 I the at $200.00 or more per mont l, me m mg m eres ' 
rate of 5% on deferred balances." The eourt uotfd 
that "real estate purchase contracts differ iu tlteir prn 
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n.,10m depending upon the nature of the property 
inro!Yed and the individual requirements of the parties." 
Further, the agreement contemplated that a real estate 
wntract would be drawn in the future which would 
contain "new and additional provisions not mentioned 
m the agreement." Due to the uncertainty and indefii-
' niteness thus created by the agreement, the court held 
' that the contract could not be specifically enforced as 
the plaintiffs contended and as the trial court had 
directed. 
The court noted that numerous important matters 
i 11ere left undecided by the parties, including such 
matters as forfeiture rights and procedures, right to 
hquidated damages for breach, extent of insurance to 
be carried, by whom and for whose benefit, right to 
make capital improvements with or without permission 
of the seller, protection against mechanic and material-
meu's liens suffered by the parties, right to remove 
personal property without seller's permission, rights 
of buyer as to the use of the property, when and where 
nwuthly payments were to be made by the purchaser, 
responsibility for injury to third persons on the prem-
ises. The court noted at page 471 of its opinion: 
''Respondents have not indicated in their 
brief whether the 'usual and standard' real estate 
purehase contract includes any provisions rela-
tiYe to the matters mentioned above. They argue 
that it is not necessary for the earnest money 
agreement to contain a ·forfeiture clause, a desig-
ua tiou of the place of payment, any provision 
a-, to who shall bear the risk of loss during the 
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life ?f the contract, or any provision relative to 
fire msurance. It may be true that such matter· 
are not ordinarily provided for in an earnes~ 
money agreement, but respondents recognize 
that the contemplated real estate contract is to 
contain some new and additional provisions not 
mentioned in the agreement." 
After reviewing previous similar cases, the court con-
cluded at page 472: 
"We conclude that the agreement here, in so 
far as it looks to the preparation and execution 
of a future real estate purchase contract upon 
which the minds of the parties have not met, is 
not sufficiently definite and certain and cannot 
be specifically enforced." 
The present case presents even more compelling 
reasons for denying specific performance than did the 
Hubbell case, supra. The total amount involved in that 
sale was $29,000.00 and it included only an apartment 
building and personal property contained therein. 
Further, it involved a deposit of $500.00 and a down 
payment of $9,000.00 which together, accounted nearly 
one-third of the total purchase price. By contrast, the 
Earnest Money Receipt in the present case involves 
a wide range of properties worth over $270,000.00, 
including real and personal properties, including ma· 
chinery and equipment and water rights worth at least 
$206,000.00, livestock worth $50,000.00 to $60,000.00 
and range rights worth at least $5,100.00. 'fhese 
values are more than nine times greater than those 
involved in Hubbell, snpra, yet it calls for the same 
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deposit of only $500.00 and a down payment of $14,-
500.00 which together amount to only one-eighteenth 
of the total purchase price. The agreement was further 
complicated moreover by reservation to the Bennions 
of a life estate in five acres and title to sixty additional 
acres and sufficient irrigation and culinary water to be 
used on them. 
These comparisons are especially significant when 
one considers that the importance and the number of 
matters which must be provided for and agreed upon 
in a sale such as is involved here depend directly upon 
the value and nature of the properties involved. Thus 
it is only to be expected that a single sale involving 
greater values and a wider range of different properties 
will require greater detail as to agreement than one 
inrolYing less value and less complex properties. Hav-
ing this in mind, it is important to note that a single 
sheet of pa per, prepared by Amoss, on a form not 
particularly suitable for sales of the type involved here, 
constitutes the entire written evidence of the proposed 
sale. And it is not only fatally lacking in important 
details of the agreement, upon which the parties never 
reached agreement, but fails entirely to even mention 
matters which even Amoss concedes were essential parts 
of the agreement that was reached. 
This Court has held that an Earnest Money Receipt 
and off er to purchase may constitute a binding contract, 
11hich defelldants readily concede, but it has stated that 
an enforceable contract will not be found to exist unless 
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the requisite standards of certainty and definiteness 
are met. Bunnell v. Bills, 13 Utah 2d 83, 368 P2d 597 
( 1962) ; Reich v. Christopulos, 123 Utah 137, 256 P2d 
238 (1953). It is submitted that it would be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for one of the parties to 
draw up a binding contract on a single page Earnest 
Money Receipt form under the facts and complexities 
involved in this case, and in view of the value and nature 
of the properties to be used. Indeed, even a disinter-
ested and skilled third party would have to exercise 
great care in order to draft a binding contract on such 
a form for sale of these properties under these circurn· 
stances. If the rule were otherwise, the courts would be 
compelled to write the contract for the parties which 
they are not in a position to do. 
In the Bunnell case, supra, this Court rejected the 
claim of a seller of real property that an Earnest Money 
Receipt signed by him was too indefinite and uncertain 
to be enforceable where it required the purchaser to 
convey by a Uniform Real Estate Contract, as a part 
of her down payment for the property being purchased, 
other property owned by the purchaser. This Court 
there found a complete lack of substance in claims 
by the seller that a failure to specify interest, where 
none was to be charged, and "price and terms" for the 
. t 
trade-in property, where the Earnest .Money Rec~Ip 
specifically provided a price of $15,000.00 and the time 
h ser the conveyance was to be made. There the pure a · 
had been willing to complete the sale and convey the 
trade-in property but the seller had sold his real prop· 
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crty to a third party on more favorable terms than 
those agreed upon with the original purchaser. This 
Court there found the seller's claims as to unenforce-
ability to be "nothing more than an attempt to evade 
the obligations of a valid contract." 
The 1l cese case, supra, was a suit to recover a 
broker's commission as to a proposed sale which was 
nerer consummated, due to a dispute between the buyer 
and seller, as in the present case, over the construction 
of the terms used in the Earnest Money Receipt. So 
the issue as to what certainty is required to make a 
binding contract was not reached. This Court there, 
howe,·er, set forth the standards of conduct which a 
seller can expect of his real estate agent in terms par-
ticularly applicable to the facts of the present case as 
follows: 
".Mr. Reese further avers that as between him 
and Harper, their dealings were at arm's length; 
that he was under no particular duty to coddle 
and 'spoonf eed' Harper; that inasmuch as the 
latter had ample opportunity to read the Receipt 
and thereafter voluntarily signed it, he is pre-
cluded from questioning its contents and is bound 
by it." 
"The above contention is sound as between 
people dealing with each other under usual cir-
cumstances. But the relationship of real estate 
agent and client makes the situation quite differ-
ent. The agent is issued a license and permitted 
to hold himself 0~1t to the public as qualified by 
training and experience to render a specialized 
service in the field of real estate transactions. 
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There rests U_POn him the r.esponsibility of hori 
estly and fairly representmg the interests of 
those wh~ e~gage his services, and upon failing 
to do so his license may be revoked. Accordingly 
persons who entrust their business to such agent; 
are entitled to repose some degree of confidence 
that they will be loyal to such trust and that 
th~y will, with reason~ble diligence and in good 
faith, represent the mterests of their clients. 
Unless the law demands this standard, instead 
of being the badge of competence and integrity 
it is supposed to be, the license would serve onlr 
as a foil to lure the unsuspecting public in t;i 
be duped by people more skilled and experi· 
enced in such affairs than are they, when they 
would be better off taking care of such busines~ 
for themselves." 
"Because of the specilized service the real es· 
tate broker offers in acting as an agent for his 
client there arises a fiduciary relationship be· 
tween them; it is incumbent upon him to apply 
his abilities and knowledge to the advantage of 
the man he serves; and to make full disclosu~e 
of all facts which his principal should know m 
transacting the business." 
"It is pertinent to observe that the. broker 
Reese had Mr. Harper at even more d1sad;;~· 
tage than might normally be expected. . e 
wide difference in experience and . busmess 
· b · an un· 
acumen resulting in the parties emg. m 1. 1 · · th ngs w 11c 1equal position for bargammg are 1 . 1 
the court and jury were entitled to ta~e JIJ ~ 
consideration in determining the matters 
111 
con 
M H ·as a farmer. tention between them. r. arper ~ 1 ard 
obviously inexperienced in business; "ff~as 111. in 
of hearing and therefore had some di icu ~ 
26 
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eon versing with others; and in addition thereto 
the court made an express finding indicating 
that he was somewhat inept and lacking in 
acumen with respect to business affairs." 
ln this same connection, the standard of conduct 
to which an attorney is held in dealing on his own behalf 
with lay persons, and the effect of overreaching on his 
part is referred to in Andreasen v. Hansen, 8 Utah 2d 
370, 335 P2d 404 ( 1959) . 
The Reich case, supra, also involved a suit on an 
Earnest Money Receipt and a claim by the real estate 
agent to a commission on the sale involved in the action. 
On appeal the only issue was the agent's right to the 
commission, but this Court in its opinion noted that 
"the earnest money receipt here was only preliminary; 
it looked toward the execution of a uniform real estate 
contract," and that the purchaser was, therefore, free 
to back out of the agreement to sell until the uniform 
real state contract had been entered into. 
In Bruygernan v. Sokol, (Calif. D. C. 1954), 265 
P2d 575, an escrow agreement was held unenforceable 
on the grounds, among others, that the form of the 
instruments of conveyance, the time of payment of 
interest and the terms of all encumbrances to represent 
the payment were uncertain and indefinite. 
In Bentzen v. N.H. Ranch, Inc., (Wyo., 1958), 
B2o P2d 440, an "agreement for Warranty Deed" 
whieli resembled somewhat in appearance the Earnest 
Jloney Receipt inYolved in the present case, was held 
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to be unenforceable where it provided that for "balance 
payable by future agreement on or before January I. 
1954." The court there stated at page 444: · . 
"Defendants ... seem to adopt the view that 
the matter of payment was a mere detail. ... we 
do not deem this so; and the question of the 
method of making deferred payments seems to 
be even more compelling in sizeable transactions 
wherein the method of amortization, the time 
to be consumed therebv and the interest to be 
paid, are, from a pra~tical standpoint, impor-
tant and often controlling features." 
For a collection of cases in which the terms goyern-
ing the manner and time of payment of the price agreed 
upon have been regarded as of sufficient importance 
to warrant denial of specific performance unless set 
forth with certainty, see Annotation, 68 A.L.R. 2d 1221, 
Section 2 at page 1222. See, for example, Roberts v. 
Adams, (Calif. D.C., 1958), 330 P2d 900, in which the 
lessee under a lease-purchase option agreed to pay a 
total sum of $85,000.00 "payable as mutually agree-
able by both parties." The court there held that the 
"failure to specify or furnish a standard for determi-
nation of terms of payment and method of securing 
the unpaid balance of the purchase price of real or ot~1er 
property is fatal to its enforceability notwithstandmg 
any desire of the courts to be liberal and helpful.'' 
In Bryant v. Clark', (Tex. App. 1961), 347 SW 
. . f $10 Q(l0.00 
2d 635, the contract provided for a price o • ' 
$ d 
"fift en annual 
with a down payment of , 2,000.00 an e ' 
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mstallmcnts as balance." The court denied specific 
performance on the ground that neither the time nor 
conditions of the annual installments were fixed. 
In Reeves v. Littlefield, (Mont. 1936), 54 P2d 
879, the contract provided a price of $900.00, of which 
$100.00 was to be a down payment, balance at $20.00 
per month with 6% interest. The purchaser offeror 
requested that the seller have her attorney draw up a 
contract. In concluding that the contract was unenforce-
able the court noted at page 880 that 
"No mention was made as to whether the 
property was conveyed by deed and a mortgage 
given as security for the deferred payments, 
or a contract retaining title in the vendor, or a 
conveyance of the property outright with no 
security ... nothing was said as to the remedies 
available in the event of default in payment by 
the purchaser . . . no time was specified when 
the interest shall be payable, whether annually, 
monthly or after all of the payments on the 
principal had been made. No place of payment 
is suggested in any of the correspondence. It 
is man if est from the correspondence that the 
parties contemplated the making of a future 
contract which. doubtless, would include many 
provisions relating to the subjects which we have 
suggested, about which the correspondence was 
altogether silent." 
That tlie Earnest Money Receipt in the present 
case is fatallv uncertain and deficient in a multitude 
11f particular~ is readily apparent, not only from the 
repented disputes over a two-month period as to numer-
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ous essential matters between Bennion and Amoss, but 
from a review of the terms contained in the document 
itself. That it is fatally uncertain and deficient is also 
apparent from the fact that it makes no mention of 
the Keel property or irrigation rights therefor although 
Amoss agrees that was an essential part of the whole 
transaction. 
The inventory of personal property which was to 
have been attached to the document as Exhibit "C" was 
never even prepared. 
The document provides, at line 14, for payment of 
"$1.t.,000.00 Fourteen Thous Five Hund on 
delivery of deed or final contract of sale which 
shall be on or before Sept. l, 1964 and $ .......... .. 
each year commencing l year from date of clos-
ing payble in 15 equal annual payments. Buyer 
to assume Federal Land Bank Loan, P.C.A 
Livestock Loan & R. Schofield Range contract 
until the balance of $-------------------- together witl1 
interest is paid." 
At line 27 it further provides that 
"Contract of Sale or Instrument of convey-
ance to be made in the name of Dudley M 
Amoss." 
And at line 33, in fine print, 
"It is understood that the terms writt~n ID 
this receipt constitute the entire preli!11H~~ry 
contract between the purchaser and the se ei_ .. 
and that no verbal statement made liy rznY
011
' 
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relative to this transaction shall be construed to 
be a part of this transaction unless incorporated 
in writing herein. It is further agreed that exe-
cution of the final contract shall abrogate this 
Earnest .Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase." 
( ~~mphasis added). 
There can be no doubt from the quoted excerpts 
that a formal contract of sale was to have been pre-
pared to implement the sale and spell out the details. 
This was to have been done by Amoss, who insisted that 
he be permitted to draft it, presumably so he could make 
it the way he wanted it. Yet it having been agreed 
that he could do it, and knowing the importance to 
himself and to Bennion of getting the many essential 
details down in written form so they could be reviewed 
and agreed upon, he let the matter drift along, perhaps 
purposefully, heedless of Bennions' repeated inquiry 
as to when they could be expected. 
This conduct becomes all the more censurable 
when considered in the light of the repeated serious 
disputes during that period as to the meaning of the 
Earnest .Money Receipt and what had been agreed 
upon. Amoss was told within a day or two after the 
document was signed that Bennion violently denied 
his right to deduct the P.C.A. and Schofield debts, and 
then himself orally agreed with Bennions' position 
both on his own behalf and through his partner, Brown. 
It was, therefore, all the more incumbent upon him 
lo get the matter resolved by a formal contract of sale, 
~ 1 he had agreed to do, rather than do nothing and 
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hope that l\Ir. Bennion would trip upon legal techni-
calities and lose his rights by default. 
Yet, after two months of anxious waiting by the 
Bennions for the contract to be furnished by Amoss, and 
Amoss, by then having himself sold most of the Bennion 
livestock, he apparently decided that he was in a suffi-
ciently strong position to force Bennions' submission. 
So he suddenly changed his position and boldly an-
nounced, in the time-worn phrase used by those who 
intend to hide behind legal technicalities, that he would 
"stand on that contract." 
Needless to say, had the contract of sale been pre-
pared in good faith in advance of the September l, 
1964, closing date as contemplated it is probable that 
all terms could have been amicably agreed upon and 
the sale completed. But Amoss now seeks to take 
advantage of the situation created by his own failure. 
perhaps intentional, to perform as agreed. The matter 
of the deduction and other problems having been spe· 
cifically and directly raised with Amoss and Brown. 
and the Bennions having thereafter delivered their lands 
and livestock to Amoss and attempted in every possible 
way to assist Amoss in reliance upon the concession by 
Amoss and Brown that the Bennion position was car· 
rect, it is shocking that he would then seek claim by the 
advantage of his own duplicity. And having repeatedly 
given Bennion to believe that the contract would .be 
furnished, Amoss should not now be permitted to clauu 
that it was not required. The need for a detailed con· 
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tract was apparent from the very beginning, even to 
Bennion, who lacks legal training. That it was needed 
is also amply borne out by the present status of affairs 
between Bennion and Amoss. Not only were numerous 
material and important matters left for agreement 
between the parties, but the terms of the Earnest Money 
Receipt, even as drawn, are unclear and uncertain. 
The following material and important questions, by 
\\'ay of example, were left to be agreed upon or un-
certain under the Earnest Money Receipt as drawn, 
many of which were never even discussed between the 
parties at any time and many of which refer to matters 
which are discussed in the cases cited above. 
I 
1. Although defendants conceded that a suffi-
ciently definite understanding was had as to the 
overall lands to be conveyed, being virtually all 
of the Bennion Ranches, what is the description 
of the five-acre life estate which was reserved? 
"That is the amount of the irrigation and culinary 
water to be furnished and at what times and upon 
what conditions was it to be furnished? What 
charges, if any, might be made against the water 
thus reserved? For how long a period was the water 
reserved? \Vas the life estate reserved for the life 
of Mr. Bennion, Mrs. Bennion, the survivor of 
them or the corporation? Were the water rights 
reserved for a similar period or was outright own-
ership reserved? 
'2. 'Vhat is the acreage and description of the 
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Keel place, which although it had been resene<l 
prior to the signing of the document, is not mn 
mentioned therein~ Bennion says it was sixty acres. 
with corresponding water rights, as would be e~­
pected. Amoss says it was forty acres and without 
any water rights, which would be absurd. \Yas it 
to be pie-shaped as the proposed mortgage dra11 11 
by Amoss would indicate, or following the some· 
what irregular ledge along the north side as Ben· 
nion says? How can the inclusion of the Keel prop- ' 
erty as an essential part of the whole sale be recon-
ciled with the recital in the agreement that it con· 
tained the entire contract between the parties and 
that no verbal understandings could be considered! 
Could the water rights be sold without the sellers' 
permission? 'Vere they to be included under the 
mortgage? 
3. 'Vhat items of personal property were included 
in the sale? A list was never prepared to he at· 
tached as the document indicates. \Vere the ma· 
chinery, equipment and other items of personal 
property to be included in the mortgage! CoulJ 
they be sold or replaced without the sellers' per· 
mission? Would later-acquired or replacement 
property and livestock be included under the mort· 
gage? Upon sale of the livestock by Amoss. what 
obligation did he have as to accounting for and 
. . f l d f 1 t > protetl apphcat10n o t 1e procee s o sa e so as < , 
llennion's security interest in the cattle! \\ :i' 
. 1 l rf nrr Jier1I 
Amoss to be reqrnred to keep up t le Jree 1 I"' 
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as to number and quality of sheep and cattle, or 
could he sell them as he pleased and leave the ranch 
without cattle to run on it? Could Amoss sell off 
the cattle without restriction, as he claims, leaving 
Hennion accountable to the P.C.A. and in breach 
of his loan agreement with them? These matters 
are of utmost importance to a ranching operation. 
4. Since Amoss admits that he was to pay from 
his own funds, without the right of deduction, 
the real estate commission which he "assumes" 
under the agreement, what portion, if any, of the 
payments to Federal Land Bank, P.C.A. and 
Schofield, which he also agreed to "assume," would 
he be obliged to pay from his own funds without 
the right of deduction from the purchase price? 
In other words, does the contract mean Amoss is 
to pay the purchase price plus the loans, or the 
purchase price minus the loans? Or does it mean 
simply, as they agreed and as Bennion understood, 
that Amoss would be responsible for seeing that 
they were paid and that the right to a deduction 
from the purchase price would be governed by 
their further understanding in that regard that 
only the Federal Land Bank debt would be de-
ducted? If, as Amoss claims, all of the debts listed 
on lines 17 and 18 were to be treated the same, 
why should he be permitted a deduction as to any 
of them, since he admits there was to be none for 
the real estate commission? ( R. 272) . 
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5. 'Vlrnt is the unpaid balance and the amount 
of monthly payments which are left blank on line~ 
14 and 19 of the Earnest JHoney lleceipt! ()
11 
what day of the year does each payment fall due~ 
Since the first payment is due "one year from <late 
of closing," are the payments due at );early inter· 
vals from the "date of closing" in the instrument, 
which is September l, 1964, or does it mean the 
actual date of closing, which as yet has not oc· 
curred? 'Vhere and to whom are the payments tu 
be made? "That remedies do the sellers have in case 
of buyer's default? This is very important here 
where the down payment is so minimal. Wheu. 
where and to whom is interest to be paid? Is it 
to be paid from the first or the last payments or 
spread evenly over the entire contract? How is 
interest to be computed in case of default? 
6. 'Vhat instruments are to secure the obligations'. 
Is it to be a deed and mortgage back or an escrmr 
agreement or a contract of sale or some other in· 
strument? "That property is to be included under 
the mortgage ?-The realty, the water stock, the 
livestock, the equipment, the personal property, 
11 es1 or Amoss' Greathouse ranch? Can se ers ass" 
late charges? Can the purchaser make prepay-
ments, and if so, on what terms? 
7. 'Vhere is the closing to take place? How .much 
· b t intau1 on fire and other insurance is uyer o ma ' · 
. . I . k l for wh'''r what properties, agamst w mt ns ·s am 
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benefit? \Vhat are sellers' remedies m case of 
waste? 
8. Does the buyer have a right to assign his in-
terest { If so, under what conditions? These matters 
are particularly important where, as here, the down 
payment amounts to less than 6% of the purchase 
price. 
9.\Vhat form is the contract of sale to take? Whose 
interpretation is to govern on disputes as to inter-
pretation of the Earnest Money Receipt? As to 
matters not mentioned? As to matters never dis-
cussed? As to matters not even thought of? The 
whole reason behind the contemplated contract 
of sale was to get all of the above matters down 
in written, definite and binding form. The need 
for such a contract is obvious. 
The numerous important issues noted above must 
be compared with those left open in Williams v. Man-
chester Bldg. Supply Co., (Ga., 1957), 97 SE2d 129, 
in which the seller conveyed property, reserving "the 
home house where he lived together with fifty acres 
lying east and fifty acres lying west." A decree of spe-
cific performance was reversed on the ground of vague-
ness and uncertainty even though all of the reserved 
lands were mentioned in the contract. The facts in that 
case and the issues between the parties are strikingly 
similar to those involved in the present case. 
The Earnest l\f oney receipt is unenforceable for 
)'et another and separate reason. Although it recites 
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that a deposit of $500.00 was made to bind the agree-
ment, not a single penny has ever been paid to the 
sellers. An<l, although Amoss now claims to hare paid 
$500.00 to his partner Brown, there is no claim that 
1
r 
was ever delivered to Bennion. Rather, the only par 
ments by Amoss to anyone were payments 011 the 
P.C.A. loan of a portion of the moneys he receired 
upon sale of Bennion's livestock. He hasn't pai<l a 
single penny out of his own pocket but rather, ha) 
retained a substantial portion of the proceeds from the 
sale of the livestock for himself. 
Having failed to pay the agreed consideration. 
the contract is not enforceable. As is stated in 17 Am. 
J ur. 2d 433 (Contracts, Section 90) : 
"A mere recital of receipt of consideration in 
a simple written contract does not preclude proof 
that the consideration was never paid, even for 
the purpose of preventing the contract from lwr· 
ing legal operation. The true rule appe~rs to h; 
that recitals of consideration, unless mtenrleo 
themselves to embody a contractual right or 
obligation, may be contradicted, inasm\1ch as 
the consideration of a written instrument is gen· 
erally open to inquiry." (Emphasis added). 
To the same effect are l Corbin on Contracts 559, Sec· 
tion 130; 17 C.J.S. 756 (Contracts, Section 73). 
Even if Amoss paid $500.00 to Brown as he IW'' 
. . t t Benn1011 claims, such would not constitute paymen ° 
where it was never delivered to him and Brown wai 
1 1 t hr Aninss Amoss' partner. Rat 1er sue l a paymen . 
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1 
1 
\\llltld ha,·e the legal effect of a payment to himself, 
1t having been retained by Brown. This failure of 
cousiueration, of course, entitles defendants to rescind 
the contract. 17 A C.J .S. 515 (Contracts, Section 420). 
Even if, as Amoss claims, the contract were de-
termined to support his position as to his right to 
deductions, it would be an error for the lower court 
. to rule as a matter of law that it was not subject to 
' ehallenge. Rather, the defendants should be permitted 
to show that by Amoss' conduct and their reliance 
thereon, tu their detriment, he is estopped under all 
of the circumstances to now deny the correctness of 
their position on deductions. The matter was raised 
with him directly and he agreed with Bennion's posi-
tion, both personally and through his partner, Brown. 
He then permitted the Bennions rely upon that rep-
resentation and that belief for a period of two crucial 
months, during which time the Bennions changed their 
position in reliance upon his acquiescence, assisting him 
in every possible way by taking care of the livestock 
and the lands, irrigating and harvesting crops, deliver-
ing to him their lands and livestock, permitting him 
to sell the livestock without holding him to a strict 
accountiug of numbers and proceeds as agreed, and 
foregoing their right to have the matter determined 
in a court at that point. Then he reneged on his prior 
concurrence with their position and claimed the right 
tu lllake deductions. Thus, even if the Bennions were 
neting under a misconstruction of the contract, which 
they s1 rnngl~· deny, by permitting them to so act to 
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their detriment, Amoss became bound by that miscou 
st~uction. Letta v. Cincinnati Iron & Steel Co., (otli 
Cir. 1922), 285 Fe<l. 707; TVillard H elburn, J nc. ; 
Spiewak. (2nd Cir. 1950), 180 F2d 480; 17 Am .Jur 
344 (Contracts, Section 9). Cf Carey v. U.S., (Ct. Cl., 
1960), 276 F2d 385; Caldwell v. Anschutz Drilling Co., 
13 Utah 2d 177, 369 P2<l 964 ( 1962) ; Sprague v. 
Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, 294 P2d 
689 ( 1956) ; Larsen v. Knight, 120 Utah 261, 233 P2d 
365 ( 1951). And that the withholding of filing a suit 
to determine contract rights will invoke this principle. 
see Grand Trunk Western R. Co. v. H. W. Nelson Co., 
(6th Cir. 1941), 116 F2d 823. 
The present proceeding being an equity action, 
moreover, requires that Amoss come into Court with 
clean hands. The foregoing conduct precludes him from 
attaining that requisite status in these proceedings. 
Another separate ground why the contract, eren 
if otherwise valid, should not have been held enforce· 
able as a matter of law, is that of mistake, for which 
reformation or rescission of the contract may be granted. 
Thus it is stated in Sine v. Harper, U8 Utah 415, 222 
P 2d 571 (1950), that ... 
" ... the power of the Court to rectify mu~ual 
mistake implies that this power may be exercis~d 
notwithstanding that the true agreem~1:t of~ e 
I)arties had not been expressed in writing. ·1°
1 
. l anot 1e1 
does the rule make any mroaf upon.' ti .1 
principle, that the plaintiff must show first ;a 
there was an actually concluded agreement an c-
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ce<lent to the instrument which is sought to be 
rectified; and secondly, that such agreement has 
been inaccurately represented in the instrument. 
When this is proved either party may claim, in 
spite of the Statute of Frauds, that the instru-
ment on >vhich the other insists does not repre-
sent the real agreement." 
* * * 
''\Ye prefer to follow the rule which permits 
the reformation of contracts in such cases as 
this, particularly where, as here, the instrument 
contains all of the terms necessary to comply 
with the statute of frauds but through a mistake 
of fact one or more of the essential terms is 
omitted or by mistake incorrectly stated. The 
adoption of this principle is in keeping with 
the theory that the statute of frauds should not 
abridge the remedy of reformation and should 
not be used as a shield to prevent the instrument 
from being reformed to show the true intent 
of the parties. 'Ve, therefore, conclude that the 
reformation is not prohibited by the statute of 
frauds." 
In that case, the purchaser sued for reformation 
01 an instrument of conveyance on the ground that 
1hrough mistake it included only a portion of the real 
rroperty which the seller had agreed to convey. The 
· ieller claimed there was no mistake since she had always 
lnown how much land was conveyed and had intended 
1
·
0 convey no more. This Court there sustained the 
Jc\ion of the trial court in admitting evidence of the 
'i·ansactions and negotiations surrounding the execu-
'irin 11f the contract and upheld a reformation of the 
'
11lllraet to include the additional land which the true 
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agreement of the parties was determined to haw eiiu-
templated. 
Another case which reaffirmed the reformation u! 
a contract to correct a material mistake is McMahun 
v. Tanner, 122 Utah 333, 249 P2d 502 ( 1952). 
A case holding that the seller had a right to rescind 
the contract under facts very similar to those in the 
present case is JV right v. Lowe, (Calif. D.C. 1956). 
296 P2d 34. In that case, the buyer agreed "to assume 
the assessments, and the property as delivered is to be 
free of assessment." The purchase price was $12,200.00 
and at the time the contract was entered into there were 
street and sewer assessments of $8,000.00 which had 
been levied and constituted a lien against the property. 
The purchaser contended, as does the plaintiff here, 
that the quoted language entitled him to deduct the 
assessments from the purchase price. The seller con· 
tended that the purchase price was to be paid by the 
purchaser in addition to the assessments. The court 
there held that there was a mutual mistake which en· 
titled the seller to rescind the contract. 
In the present case, the trial court by its summal) 
judgment deprived the defendants of their right b< 
prove their right to have the contract rescinded or re· 
formed to correspond with the true agreement of tlir 
parties. 
Quite apart from the foregoing, the defendanll 
were entitled to show that they hn<l substantially co!11 
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plied with the terms of the contract but that Amoss 
I 11 as in breach of the contract. In this regard, Bennion 
\ undertook upou signing the Earnest .Money Receipt 
1 to have all of his abstracts brought to date and all of 
these were furnished to Amoss, with the exception of 
an abstract covering 160 acres of land as to which the 
abstracter, through no fault of Bennion, experienced 
1ome delay iu bringing it to date. Except for the minor 
matter of this abstract of 160 acres, which was ordered 
about the middle of August, 1964, Bennion had, at the 
time relations were ruptured by Amoss, performed 
erery obligation required on his part. Amoss, on the 
nther hand, had performed none of his obligations. He 
had pai<l no consideration, and still hasn't; he had drawn 
110 coutract of sale, and still hasn't; and, he had failed 
to account as to the livestock he sold. Nor did he offer 
to perform these obligations, within the required time. 
Thus, Amoss is not entitled to demand specific per-
formance in this case, for as it is stated in 49 Am J ur 
.H (Specific Performance, Section 40) : 
"The failure or inability or refusal to carry 
out the terms of the contract at the time when 
performance is due will ordinarily be grounds 
for refusing specific performance, since specific 
performance will not generally be decreed in 
farnr of a party who has himself been in default, 
or who has wilfullv violated his part of the con-
tract, wherebv the. defendant has been deprived 
of a substantral benefit under it." 
1 And in 81 CJS 691 (Specific Performance, Section 
1 I:]] I it is stated: 
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"Plaintiff in a suit for speeifie 11ci·f'o 
1 . . 1' fllllllltt must s 10w that he is not m default." 
This failure of performance by ..i:\moss entitle, Je-
fendants to resei11d the eoutraet. Pool z·. ~lJ ult 1. ·• f ' ,),) 
Ctah 288, 185 Pae 714 ( HH\J) ; Xichuls i·. Hain(!/ 
(Okla 194:.!), 12:.! P2d 809; 17 A CJ S 5 rn ( Contrat;i, 
Section 422 ( 1) ) ; 17 Am J ur 2d 97U (Contracts, Ste· 
tion 502). 
A review of the judgment in this case (R. 73-7.i! 
readily reveals the error of the determination made by 
the lower eourt. X ot only does the court there holG 
that the "assumed" indebtedness on the debts to the 
Federal Land Hank, the P.C.A. and Schofield 'm 
to be credited toward payment of the total purcha11· 
price" but it orders the llennions to convey all of their 
properties excepting the life estate "in a fenced tire· 
acre parcel, upon which is located the Bennion home 
and excepting also a forty-acre tract which is describea 
by metes and bounds. 
That the word "assume" as used in the Earnesi 
l\Ioney Receipt would he held to be certain and subjet! 
to enforcement without further evidence under !lit 
facts of this case is disturbing, as will be discussed und'.r 
Part II below. That a description of the fhe-:H:re ]ttr 
estate is contained in the judgment when there .1s 
111
' I 
. . 1 . tl I i . surpr11111~ such clesenption anyw 1ere m 1e recur< s · 
. . • . . t . , ud Loun1l• 
Ilowevcr, 1t 1s totally mcred1hle that a me es J 
• • • .r • t· . d in the sun1· 
descript1ou of the Keel place 1s con ame .. 
I t ine11t11·l· mary judgment, in view of the faet t 1a no 
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I l . . . h E I ;ibatel'el' is ma< e of it m t e arnest Money Receipt. 
It becomes eren more incredible and disturbing in view 
of the dired dispute, disclosed by the record, between 
Jmoss and Bennion as to the acreage involved in that 
tract. Amoss claims it is forty acres and the lower 
court has upheld that claim without evidence even 
illough he was aware that Bennion claimed it was sixty 
;tres. The description contained in the judgment, 
moreover, forms a rectangle ( R. 7 4) whereas the de-
1tription for the same parcel contained in the proposed 
mortgage, prepared and submitted by Amoss himself 
to G'ibson (Exhibit 5D) forms a triangle. On the other 
iland, the reservation, according to Bennion, was of 
a parcel enclosed on the East, South and 'Vest by 
itraight lines but on the North by an irregular ledge 
for which a description was to have been supplied at 
alater date. The absurd division of the Keel place in 
ll1e judgment was obviously concocted by someone 
wholly unfamiliar with the land involved since it cuts 
icross two pieces of irrigated lands at an awkward 
angle leaving large portions of each unusable and 
iuaking the irrigation system unsuitable. The resolution 
nl this strongly disputed issue in Amoss' favor without 
~iring Bennion a chance to be heard is characteristic 
'
1l'the trial court's approach to this entire case and is 
iotal!y unsupportable. 
Further, the judgme11t requires the Bennions to 
r·rinvey to Amoss, all water rights except "the use of 
irigatiun water for the five-acre life estate," the amount 
1111hil'h i.-; unspecified. No provision whatever is made 
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l 
I 
for the reservation of any water for use on the Keel [ de 
place despite llennion's repeated testimony that sucli ,~] 
was also agreed to be reserved. Here again the Eames! tn 
Money Receipt is totally silent, yet it is absurd to expecl he 
that the Bennions would reserve forty acres of irrigateil de 
hay crop lands without any water to go with them. 1 }'( 
'Vithout water they would be practically nllueles~. ' Ai 
Yet here again on a strongly disputed issue the trial Ai 
court resolved it in favor of Amoss without permitting de 
Bennion to be heard and present his case. I rn1 
These very serious errors and omissions are hut 
further evidence of the insatiable desire of Amoss to th1 
take every possible advantage and avoid every possible W 
liability in enforcing this contract. His conduct a1 ag 
disclosed by this record indicates clear overreaching a 1 
and a brazen insistance upon pressing his "legal rights'' !'re 
to their outermost limit. He cannot be permitted to de1 
so easily run roughshod over the Bennions' rights ano 
deprive them of the rights and properties acquireil 
through a long lifetime of hard work. 
POINT II 
THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN RCLIX(, 
THAT, AS A MATTER OF LAW, PLAINTIFF 
"\VAS ENTITLED TO DEDUCT THE MORT· 
GAGE DEBTS FR 0 M THE PURCHASE l'o 
PRICE. Ian 
d d h h 
men! 11:11 111g 
It was clearly un erstoo w en t e agree , ~ I T . I nn111, 11 • 
made that only the amount of the F edera ~dll( 
46 
debt would be deducted from the purchase price of 
,~!97,000.00. Amoss and Brown agreed that this was 
true but then Amoss reneged. The Court held, without 
hearing any evidence, that the 'contract was clear and 
definite in permitting deduction of the debts owed the 
. I Federal Land Bank, the P .C.A. and Schofield, which 
' Amoss agreed "to assume." The court disregarded 
Amoss' admission that he did not have the right to 
, I deduct the real estate commission which he also "as-
, rnmes" under the contract. 
That the term "assume" is ambiguous as used in 
1 the contract is readily apparent under the cases. In 
' Wright v. Lowe, supra, for example, where the buyer 
1 agreed "to assume existing loans and assessments" and 
a dispute arose over his right to deduct those sums 
!rom the purchase price. The court there affirmed the 
i denying specific performance, stating that: 
"The written contract, in fact, not only admits 
of two interpretations, one favorable to the seller 
and one to the buyer, but it may well be that if 
the contract were before us on a question of 
construction rather than of rescission, the pre-
f erred interpretation would be against the buyer 
especially because he dictated the terms ... To 
'assume' ordinarily means 'to pay.' " (Emphasis 
added). 
Similarly, in Willia7ns v. Manchester Bld,q. Supply 
l'o., supra, the contract provided that the conveyed 
lands were "subject to" a lien. The court there, in hold-
1 uig the eontract unenforceable, noted the issues raised 
111· ti . ' . . 
· lls prov1s1on: 
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"Did ( th.e pro:'ision) ... mean that the nudor. 
on the dosmg of the sale, would be required t 
pay off the indebtedness secured by the Inti; 
or that the vendee could deduct from the pur· 
chase money the amount of the debt due the 
Land llank and assume the loan 1 Or rather 
did it me~~n that the ve.ndee was buying the prop: 
erty sub.Ject to the mdebtedness agaillst tlir 
property, and it eould not deduct from the agree1l 
purchase price the amount of the debt~ Tl1e 
oral arguments of counsel for the parties dis· 
closed that the parties' construction of these 
provisions are not in accord. If the terms of tl1e 
contract are such that they can be reasonahlr 
misunderstood by the parties, clearly a eourt of 
equity has neither the power nor the means !11 
discover the intentions of the parties by mere 
guess or conjecture." 
The reasoning of the court on this issue, as well as the 
issue of uncertainty ref erred under Point I abore. is 
particularly instructive under the facts of the present 
case. 
POINT III 
THE LO,VER COURT ERRED IN RULIXlr 
THAT, AS A MATTER OF LA,V, THE COR-
PORATE DEFENDANT IS BOUND TO THE 
SA.ME DEGREE AS THE INDIYJDCAL DE· 
FENDANTS. 
At the time the Earnest .Money Receipt was signei: i 
a portion of the properties involved in the prt1Jl11~f' 1 
. I . C np·1111 sale were held by the Benmon Rane ung 01 ' · 
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l·tah corporation .. Mr. and .Mrs. Bennion each held 
~tpproximately 37% of the corporation's stock and the 
remaining 22j~ was distributed among their children. 
Bennion's attorney, J. Lambert Gibson, held a qualify-
uw share as a director. 
0 
l That the proposed sale to Amoss involved virtually 
1 
all of the property and assets of the corporation is not 
aisputed. Nor can it be claimed that the properties to 
i lie conveyed were made in the usual and regular course 
· uf its business. Thus, the proposed sale here involved 
comes squarely within the provisions of Section 16-10-
;~, U.C.A., 1953, which provides: 
"A sale, lease, exchange, mortgage, pledge, 
or other disposition of all, or substantially all, 
the property or assets, with or without the good 
will, of a corporation, if not made in the usual 
and regular course of its business, may be made 
upon such terms and conditions and for such 
consideration ... as may be authorized in the 
following manner: 
(a) The board of directors shall adopt a reso-
lution recommending such sale, lease, exchange, 
mortgage, pledge, or other disposition and di-
reeting the submission thereof to a vote at a 
meeting of shareholders, which may be either 
an annual or a special meeting. 
( b) 'V ritten or printed notice shall be given 
to each shareholder of record entitled to vote at 
sueh meeting within the time and in the manner 
proyided in this act for the giving of notice of 
~neetings of shareholders, and, whether the meet-
JJtg- he an annual or a special meeting, shall state 
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that the purpose, or one of the purposes of'. ,
1 
i 
t
. . . , sue·
mee mg is to consider the proposed sale l .· 1' 
1 
, ea.11· 
e;x:c rnnge, mortgage, pledge, or other disposi: 
hon. 
( c) _At such meeting the shareholders mai 
authorize such sa~e, le~~e, exchange, mortgag;, , 
pledge, or other d1spos1tion and mav fix ormai· 
1 . 1 '"' ' I aut ionze tie board of directors to fix, any ;r 
all of the terms and conditions thereof and tli1 l 
consideration to be received by the corporation 
therefor. 
* * * 
( d) After such authorization by a vote 01 t' 
shareholders, the board of directors neverthele11. 
in its discretion, may abandon such sale, lease. p 
exchange, mortgage, pledge, or other dispositio11 a 
of assets, subject to the rights of third partic1 11 
under any contracts relating thereto, withoul ~ 
further action or approval by shareholders." n 
However, at the time the document was signea T 
there had been no such meeting of directors and no slepi fa 
were ever taken to notify the remaining stockholder) 
and obtain their approval or dissent. Had these stepi 
been taken as required by this statute it is entire!! P, 
likely that the disputed matters would have been re· ae 
. ]t 
solved or the proposed sale cancelled at that tune. · r1 
is the purpose of the above provision to permit suet up 
a substantial transaction to be reviewed by those inter· ial 
ested and subjected to close analysis rather than. con· na, 
f d 
nrht1on) co1 
summated on the spur o the moment un er co 
d 
. . k . d d. d n·erreacl1· 'rf 
con uc1ve to m1sta re, m1sun erstan mg an ( I 
ing. It means board action by the board, acting as suci' ~p 
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cl, i :i!lll not merely the acts of its members. See Section 
II, I !ti-10-33, U.C.A. 1953. 
ltl\ 
Certainly Amoss cannot claim ignorance of this 
requirement by statute, he being a practicing attorney. 
~t, , Although there is a split of authority as to whether 
m !he corporation itself may assert the invalidity of the 
or 
mle, the better reasoned cases hold that it may do so. llil 
ion See cases collected in Annotation, 58 ALR 2d 784, 
Section 8, page 795. 
I In Michigan Wolverine Student Cooperative, Inc. 
ut i'. Goodyear. (Mich., 1946), 22 NW 2d 884, an un-
:•i. profitable but solvent corporation sued to set aside a 
'.~'. 1 aeed conveying the corporation's property to the de-
tic1 fendant. The agreement was made by the board of 
oul <lirectors without stockholder assent. The statute in-
rolved there was patterned after the Model Business 
nea Corporation Act as is the Utah provision quoted above. 
eri The Court there set aside the sale on the ground of 
Im failure to follow the prescribed statutory procedure. 
W In .Toseph Greempon's Sons Iron & Steel Co. v. 
rel! Pecos Valle.If Gas Co., (Del. 1931), 156 Atl. 350, the 
re· aefendant corporation defended its refusal to deliver 
·I! pipe under a contract, entered into by its president, 
;uc~ upon the ground he was not authorized to make the 
ter iale. The court there held that although the president 
:on· nad authority to carry on the usual business of the 
ion' corporation, this authority did not extend to matters 
id1· '1i'n1 · · A h , U.Jor l'o11cern to the corporation. s to t ese, proper 
;ur
1
' approval and assent of the corporation was required. 
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Here again the plaintiff attempts to push his !to·•i 
rights to the limit, regardless of its effect upon ;l;t 
defendants. Thus, plai~tiff's counsel first stated, citin~ 
cases, that the corporation had no standing to raise tlw 
defense of the statutory requirement referred to abore. I 
(R'. ~23, 124, 127, 170). ~hen, in response to tha! I 
pos1t10n, however, upon which the authorities differ. ' 
as noted above, the defendants moved that Don Ben· 
nion, a stockholder, be permitted to intervene to ra~e 
that defense in case the court should rule with tne I 
plaintiff on the issue, plaintiff switched his position ann 
claimed that the motion was untimely, (R. 178) ana 
that any dissatisfied stockholders should seek their relief 
against the corporation. (R. 179). 
Certainly someone is entitled to raise this defemt 
whether it be the corporation, an officer or a storl· 
holder. It was purposed for the protection of the cor 
poration and stockholders against precisely the problem 
involved here. And the plaintiff cannot be perrnitten I 
in this proceeding to insist upon the "be damned 11 
they do and be damned if they don't" approach. 
All of the authorities and issues raised as to tir 
individual defendants are, of course, equally apphc:il!lr : 
I and available as to the corporate defendant. ' 
POINT IV 
D NOT DE IF THE CONTRACT SHOUL , \! 
HELD UNENFORCEABLE, THIS APPr.. , 
MAY BE PREMATURE. I 
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On the basis of the present record in this case, 
' !be Earnest Money Receipt should be held unenforce-
able as a matter of law due to its many infirmities as 
vointed out above. In the interest of justice and to 
I aroid the expense of further expensive proceedings in 
I this case, this Court should so rule. 
' Should it, however, be held to be enforceable, it 
appears that this appeal may be premature in view of 
j this Court's recent pronouncement in Walker v. Thayn, 
17 Utah 2d 120, 405 P2d 342 ( 1965), which it is de-
fendants' duty to bring to the Court's attention. As 
will be noted in its judgment (R. 73-75) the lower 
wurt retained jurisdiction of the case to implement 
!he terms of the contract which it found to exist. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Ernest F. Baldwin Jr., and 
Milton A. Oman 
By: MILTON A. OMAN 
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah and 
701 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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